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With interest in mental illness from the standpoint of the growing field of 
Disability Studies comes a problem for the Medical Humanities. 1 Is it 
possible to discuss what may well be the most stigmatizing form of illness 
or disability in the West without understanding the complexity of the 
tradition in which it stands? The diagnostic history of mental illness is 
entangled with the history of madness as a social convention, a history that 
colors even the contemporary debates about the meanings and forms of 
mental illness in our age of brain imagery and neuro-anatomy. These 
historical images shape the world of the medical professional as well as that 
of the layperson. We all carry conflicting and competing images of what 
mental illness means and how it is to be affectively as well as intellectually 
understood. Such images have impact on the meanings associated with the 
science of mental illness as well as the reception and self-perception of 
those who are disabled because of mental illness. There is no fine line 
between images from the world of the health sciences dealing with mental 
illness and health and these popular images. 2 These images are 
interchangeable, each reifying the other. Mental illness is real because it 
fulfills our expectations of the image of madness; mental health is the 
alternative to such images. This is not to claim that mental health and 
mental illness do not exist. Only that they are so categorized because of 
how we imagine madness. Indeed, the interpretability, flexibility and 
malleability of the symptoms of mental illness (as with all symptoms of 
illness) over time reflect the expectations built on the interplay of popular 
and medical images. This article examines the function that debates about 
creativity and madness had in the construction of the disability and mental 
illness discourse over the past 100 years; including the popular stereotypes 
about mental illness (madness) that echo through the claims about mental 
illness as a form of disability.	
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Mental Illness as History 
 
It seems clear that mental illnesses, which allopathic medicine is now 
defined as neurological rather than psychiatric, have different meanings 
attached to them in the past than in the present. For example General 
Paresis of the Insane (G.P.I.), first diagnosed as a psychiatric category in 
1822 by Antoine Bayle, was suggested to have a neurological cause as early 
as 1857 (by Friedrich von Esmnarch). This was the most often diagnosed 
disease among asylum inmates and turned out to be the final stages of 
neuro-syphilis. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, this association 
between neurology and symptoms of madness was only whispered about. 
The double stigma concerning mental illness and sexually transmitted 
diseases meant that it was rarely articulated. It was only after 1913 when 
Hideyo Noguchi and J.W. Moore were able to find syphilis spirocaetes in 
virtually all of the sufferers that G.P.I. was rebranded as tertiary neuro-
syphilis. But not all of the sufferers of G.P.I., with its clear and marked 
symptoms (frozen irregular pupils, diminished Babinski reflex, radical shifts 
in mental states, including depression and memory loss leading to dementia), 
turned out to have syphilis. They were simply mad, as all with G.P.I. had 
been before 1913.3  
 The image of the person with G.P.I. is to be found in the early 
twentieth century as the ‘mad man’ without any reference to the putative 
cause of the illness. Thus Clifford Beers, the founder of the National 
Committee for Mental Hygiene, one of the very first disability advocacy 
groups in 1909, recounts in his autobiography A Mind that Found Itself (1908) 
seeing another victim, forty-five years of age, was one who had formerly 
been a successful man of affairs. Beers wrote: 
 
His was a forceful personality, and the traits of his sane days 
influenced his conduct when he broke down mentally. He was in the 
expansive phase of paresis, a phase distinguished by an exaggerated 
sense of well-being, and by delusions of grandeur which are 
symptoms of this form as well as of several other forms of mental 
disease. Paresis, as everyone knows, is considered incurable and 
victims of it seldom live more than three or four years. In this 
instance, instead of trying to make the patient's last days comfortable, 
the attendants subjected him to a course of treatment severe enough 
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to have sent even a sound man to an early grave. I endured 
privations and severe abuse for one month at the State Hospital. 
This man suffered in all ways worse treatment for many months.4  
 
This image of the oppressed insane is a commonplace in the world of 
disability advocacy. It is the image of the mad, not the bad, of the 
disordered, not the infected.  
 Hidden in the background of paresis even before the discovery of the 
actual etiology was the assumption of sexual license. Thus also in 1908 
Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche successfully brought suit to defend the memory 
of her brother the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. He had died in 1900 
after a complete mental collapse a dozen years earlier, after the biographer 
of Nietzsche’s friend Franz Overbeck mentioned in his account that 
Nietzsche may have died of G.P.I. The stigma of a sexually transmitted 
disease, even hinted at, was enough for the court to support her charges and 
the offending pages were removed from the volume. 5  Yet one of the 
themes that contributed to Overbeck’s claim connecting Nietzsche’s illness 
to infection was the view, very prevalent in the literature of the time, that 
such madness was one of the sources of true genius.6 We can see how 
malleable such a retrospective etiology – and its implications – might be in 
the more recent retrospective diagnosis of Nietzsche’s final illness as bipolar 
disorder. Unlike G.P.I., bipolar disorder is a disease without moral 
overtones, although it carries the assumption of some type of genetic cause, 
something that also would not have pleased Nietzsche’s sister.7  
 
 
Bipolar Disease as ‘Creative’ Madness 
 
The anthropologist Emily Martin sees herself as ‘mad’ – she uses this term 
in the preface to her book to provide a context for her account of bipolar 
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disorder/manic depression in the United States today.8 Clinically diagnosed 
as bipolar, she over and over documents the symptoms of her illness. She 
has hallucinations including that of the ‘sinister figure, a cold gray gargoyle, 
perched tenaciously on [her] shoulder, looking at what [she] was writing (…) 
and muttering a devastatingly negative commentary’ who haunted the very 
act of her writing. What that ‘cold gray gargoyle’ is reading over her 
shoulder is indeed her study of ‘mania (…) a new continent with a distant 
frontier, whose receding horizon invites exploration and development’. 9 
Actually, she uses this geographical phrase to describe the pharmaceutical 
companies seeking new drugs and new markets, but it is a very accurate 
view of Martin’s mapping of modern manic depression in the age of 
psychopharmacology. 
 This is a paradox for the question of madness as a disability: can you 
be simultaneously ‘mad’ and ‘rational’, a ‘sufferer’ and an ‘observer’? 
Certainly modern anthropology has wrestled with the problem of being 
both observer and participant, but what if the observer is mad? Martin sets 
this dichotomy at the core of her understanding of bipolar illness. Is mental 
illness (‘madness’) really incompatible with rational or (perhaps less 
stigmatizing) productive behavior? She is certainly not the first person to 
ask this question.  
 At the very beginning of the twentieth century Daniel Paul Schreber 
(1842-1911), lawyer, jurist, and failed parliamentary candidate, wrote and 
then published in 1903 a book length account of his mental illness. 10 
Schreber and his book were later both the prized subjects of studies by 
multiple scientists, one of which was Sigmund Freud.11 Schreber published 
his account to prove to the director of the Dresden asylum in which he was 
hospitalized that he was not mad, for mad people, even crazy lawyers, 
simply can’t write books. He wrote his book, won his case, and was released, 
only to relapse and be re-hospitalized decades later. The interest in his case 
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as an example of psychopathology by the wide range of thinkers mentioned 
above was spurred by the very text that provided egress for him from the 
asylum. 
 That such a claim is not unique to Schreber and his authorship can 
be seen in the hospitalization of the brilliant art historian Aby Warburg in 
Ludwig Binswanger’s sanatorium in Kreuzlingen from 1921 to 1924. He 
was diagnosed as ‘incurably schizoid,’ driven by paranoid fantasies of danger 
to himself and his family. There he held a talk on his ‘Reminiscences from a 
Journey to the Pueblo Indians,’ later posthumously published as A Lecture on 
the Serpent Ritual. Warburg had seen on this ritual on his visit to the Pueblos 
of northern New Mexico between December 1895 and May 1896. His 
presentation convinced Binswanger that he could now be released as 
‘normal’.12 
 Emily Martin reads the paradox between the rational and the insane 
as the key to understanding the very nature of bipolar disorder and its new 
function in American (and one can extrapolate – global) society. The 
commonplace that Schreber or Warburg successfully countered was that the 
mind of the ‘mentally ill’ is inherently fragmented and incoherent. Mental 
health meant the unity of all parts of the psyche, proven, for instance, by 
the writing of books. Mental illness signaled the disruption of such unity. 
No internal multiplicity of the sense of the self could exist in healthy people. 
In the nineteenth century, the insane could regain their coherence and their 
reason through orderly living – moral treatment – and thus recover their 
sense of full personhood. Asylums mirrored the institutions of society, 
holding dances for the inmates, providing work, mimicking an imagined 
ordered life into which the mad would return. Living with mental illness 
meant being insane. It meant accepting the role of the mad person in the 
society, beyond order and redemption. 
 The individuals whom Martin meets in bipolar support groups live 
with their bipolar disorder even when they manage it with drugs. Her 
account shows that individuals diagnosed as bipolar are quite aware of their 
multiple aspects and the course of their illness. In fact, these individuals try, 
often with some success, to manage the radical alternation of their moods 
from highs to lows without losing their sense of disorder – the lived 
experience of all of the states of bipolar disorder encompassing the highs 
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and the lows as well as a drug-provided alternative. The individuals she 
observes manage their lives, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, taking 
into account the knowledge that their chronic mental illness is part of who 
they are and will always be. 
 Yet Martin’s argument goes beyond just seeing how medicated 
bipolar individuals deal with their illness: she argues that at least one aspect 
of bipolar disorder is today seen as a model for a certain type of ‘healthy’ or 
at least productive behavior in society. This positive reading of the manic 
comes to be part of the way that bipolar individuals internalize their illness. 
The ‘manic’ aspect of their illness has come to be praised in the modern 
world as a positive character quality rather than as a sign of illness. 
According to Martin’s insightful tabulation, corporate leaders such as Steve 
Jobs (of Apple) or Richard Branson (of Virgin) are seen as manic because 
they are risk-takers. Being manic in this sense is one of our definitions of 
success. Taking risks, acting beyond the limits of social boundaries, 
demanding the right to alter the world – all are signs of the successful 
entrepreneur as well as the manic patient. 
 Indeed, Martin shows how self-labeled manic-depressives – such as 
the Johns Hopkins psychologist Kay Jamison, the 1990’s poster girl for 
bipolar disorder – create genealogies of successful ‘bipolar’ people. Drawing 
on famous individuals from Edgar Allan Poe to Vincent van Gogh to 
Virginia Woolf and Jackson Pollack and Theodore Roosevelt and beyond, 
these genealogies are engineered to show that true creativity is in no way 
pathological, that being bipolar is simply another form of being creative.13 
Indeed, bipolar disorder traced through these genealogies emerges as the 
most valued source for all true creativity. Jamison thus quietly inserts herself 
and her book in this genealogy, making more or less the same claim as 
Schreber or Warburg. Such a claim that inexorably links creativity and 
madness is seen by Jamison and other such commentators as being ancient 
(and therefore universal), having its first articulation in Plato's theory of the 
‘furores’. Though Plato clearly distinguishes between creative madness and 
mental illness, Renaissance writers such as Marsilio Ficino elide these into 
the commonplace that madness is creativity. As Rudolph and Margot 
Wittkower’s note ‘Seneca’s often quoted dictum: ‘nullum magnum ingenium 
sine mixtura dementiae fuit’ [there never has been great talent without some 
touch of madness] would seem to express this point of view. In actual fact, 
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Seneca’s further comment leaves no doubt that he referred to the Platonic 
fire of divine inspiration rather than to ‘insanity’.14 By the 19th century, the 
view that madness and creativity were inexorably linked had become a 
commonplace within clinical psychiatry, especially in the work of Cesare 
Lombroso (1836-1909) and Paul Moebius (1853-1907). This claim, fostered 
by many among disability advocates for the mentally ill, more often than not 
collides with the lived experience of people with bipolar disorder whose 
mania is as destructive to their lives as is their depression. This lived 
experience stands in sharp contrast to a contemporary culture that claims 
the manic state as a truly productive one. Now this, too, is a paradox that 
Martin avoids: she understands very well that the label manic is not the 
same as the lived experience of people with bipolar disorder, that creativity 
can be destroyed by the illness as well as furthered by it, that an individual, 
such as Kay Jamison merely being able to write that brilliant and well-
received book, is not a proof of the positive nature of the experience of 
illness for all those who live with it.15 Indeed, Jamison’s accomplishment is 
not even proof of the value of mania as a wellspring to creativity. It is quite 
possible to write in spite of and not because of one’s illness – which is an 
answer to those who claim that creativity is proof of the value of mental 
illness. 
 Martin shows how the claims of a special creative potential in people 
with bipolar disorder collide with the life experience of manic-depressive 
individuals. For Martin sees that the changing categories of mental illness 
reflect societal images of what madness is and that those who are diagnosed 
as mentally ill shape their perception of their illness based on these changing 
expectations. ‘Does society claim that I am creative because I am bipolar – 
then I had better live out that claim.’16 As Martin notes, when you are given 
a diagnosis that diagnosis becomes part of who you are. She does not claim 
that madness is merely an invention of society. She is quite happy to speak 
of the biological and perhaps even genetic underpinnings of bipolar illness. 
But she sees that the lived experience of mental illness is altered by the 
changing meanings ascribed to it. Thus in the nineteenth century mania was 
seen as a feminine quality (enthusiasm), unhealthily present in men while 
depression was a masculine quality (seriousness) present in women. Today, 
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the claims are quite reversed and mania has become the sign of a successful 
male competitor such as Branson or Jobs.  
 The view that diagnostic categories reflect social meaning and impact 
on the individual’s sense of themselves is certainly not only true of mental 
illness. Some people with cancer (an unspoken word a generation ago) now 
proudly wear a pink ribbon. Breast cancer has become socially acceptable as 
the woman’s illness, even though many more women die today of heart 
disease than breast cancer. The still unspeakable disease of men is prostrate 
cancer. It is an illness that impacts on many more men than the numbers of 
women who suffer from breast cancer and evokes the same type of sexual 
mutilation now answered by the pink ribbon. There is a little known blue 
ribbon movement for prostate cancer (pink for girls; blue for boys). But few 
wear these ribbons today. The meanings as well as the rituals that are 
attributed to suffering from a disease shift as we rethink their function in 
society. Images of healthy and ill are formed and focused by societal 
pressures to create concrete ideas of illness. As Eduard Bernays, one of the 
creators of modern advertising, wrote about public images: ‘any person or 
organization depends ultimately on public approval, and is therefore faced 
with the problem of engineering the public's consent to a program or 
goal’.17 This is equally true of the meanings associated with representations 
of mental illness. 
 One of Martin’s claims is that evidence-based medicine creates clearly 
differentiated and self-limited categories of mental illness. These categories 
are often defined by the responses to drugs provided by the pharmaceutical 
companies who need to identify patient populations they can cure. Such 
claims not only define the very nature of the disease but also the individual’s 
response. ‘I am bipolar’ is a very different claim than ‘I have debilitating 
periods of depression and mania.’ Martin is in no way anti-pharmacology. 
She documents her own use of (and benefit from) psychotropic drugs. Yet 
she shows how drugs are given personalities by the drug companies (in their 
ads to physicians and in the public media) and by patients alike. Zoloft is, 
according to one user, ‘like a little robin’s egg, it has that blue color and it 
represents hope’18 – a very different blue from that of the prostate cancer 
ribbon! If one claims ‘I am bipolar’, this is the perfect drug to answer my 
sense of hopelessness. The shape, color and form of drugs, as Martin 
carefully documents in her field work in the drug companies, are very 
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purposefully worked out: red is a bad color as it seems to evoke the hectic 
intensity of mania rather than counter it; blue is claimed to be a calming and 
peaceful color. All are part of a culture of defining mental illness and its 
treatment, which shifts from culture to culture and epoch to epoch. What 
disables the individual with mental illness may not only be the illness they 
have but the meanings they and their world attach to that illness. Are they 
disabled when they write about their mental states and, if so, what does 
disability mean in this context? 
 It is evident that to attempt to capture the relationship between 
madness and disability is to define one ambiguous and constantly shifting 
term by another. Madness has for centuries had legal and medical meanings, 
those meanings are more tangled and subject to political/ideological 
pressures than ever today in light of the framing of madness as a type of 
disability. For madness has now not only to figure itself in relation to ideas 
about competency, moral ability, curability, etc. but also in relation to 
questions of access, stigma, and advocacy.19 Madness thus evokes not only 
the wide range of stereotypes of psychological difference, from the Greeks 
to the present, but also the lived experience of those who understand 
themselves and are understood as being mad. The term suggests the medical, 
social, and cultural categories dealing with all forms of psychic pain that 
came under the purview of alienists, psychiatrists, and neurologists. By 
contrast, madness can also be understood from a patient/client/inmate 




Madness as Disability 
 
What seems to define madness in relationship to disability is the concept of 
psychic pain (or anguish or suffering). This certainly plays a major role in 
Emily Martin’s account of bipolar disorder. The very existence of psychic 
pain, for example, is today thought to be a contested source of knowledge, 
having its modern origins in John Locke’s view that ‘(...) pain [is] (...) 
sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of 
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the Mind’.20 However else madness has been defined, such psychic pain was 
and remains a litmus test for madness, whether as a reason for intervention 
or as a perceived source for greater insight into the mad and their creative 
capacities. 
 A broad understanding of madness therefore must account for 
medical perspectives, both allopathic and complementary/alternative 
practices, as well as multiple social, political, and cultural understandings of 
madness and mad people, all fluid and ever moving across the world. Every 
society has its own categories and perspectives and experiences of madness 
– from melancholia in ancient Athens to spirit madness in modern 
Evangelical churches; from the representations of madness of American 
medical missionaries in China in the nineteenth century to those selling 
cures for madness in the botanicas of the Dominicans in New York City 
today. Across the globe, societies see categories of madness as something 
that impinges on human activity, for ill or for good, and with a variety of 
meanings that generate a variety of interpretations. The realities of what 
constitutes madness in any given society or community or historical 
moment are constantly shifting: symptoms change and their meanings seem 
always in flux. Even as different etiologies and meanings of madness 
emerge to explain the somatic, psychological, social, and cultural causes of 
madness, psychic pain remains central to all of these categories. Madness 
may be the antithesis of what is called normal. Likewise, it may be related to 
other categories of illness and pain, or be a state that transcends the 
normal.21 
 Similarly, if we explore madness not in the realm of a medicalized 
society, but in the parallel world of the law, then madness takes on yet other 
colorations. The two realms are intertwined. From the forensic definitions 
of madness created by the Romans, which focused on competency, aging, 
and property, to the McNaughton rule of Victorian England, which focused 
on the moral ability to know right for wrong in the case of Daniel 
McNaughton, who attempted to assassinate the British Prime Minister 
Robert Peel in 1843, we see legal definitions of madness that parallel and 
mimic medical and social definitions of madness. But these legal definitions 
are also autonomous. Today, one does not speak of madness but rather of 
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psychiatric illness or diagnosis in the world of law. Yet the contemporary 
functional definition within the law remains inherently one developed by 
Victorian alienists. This often leads to complicated political response to the 
use of the incompetency defense in court, especially in high profile cases of 
political assassination, such as in the murder of President James Garfield by 
Charles Guiteau in 1881, or infanticide (the use of the post-natal psychosis 
in the case of Susan Smith in 1995). In both cases the defense, using a 
version of the McNaughton rule, was unsuccessful. At least a few American 





It is thus imperative to sort out what we mean when we use the categories 
of madness and psychic pain that define our object. Once we have settled 
on a particular definition or construct of madness, then we can ask how 
these limits impact on our understanding of those who are defined by these 
limits. Central to all definitions of madness is the idea of innate difference 
that is associated with it. This stereotype may be positive – debates about 
creativity and madness, for instance, go back to the ancient times – but 
most have negative consequences. These include physically isolating the 
mad from society, refusing to give the same rights to the mad as to other 
citizens, and seeing madness as a diminution of one’s humanity. 
 The Greeks regarded madness as the result of a physical imbalance of 
the four humors (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood), the bodily 
fluids that they believed regulated health and temperament. Because of this 
they created melancholic, choleric, phlegmatic, and sanguine temperaments 
and their attendant illnesses. The Chinese at the same time conceived of 
madness as an imbalance of the primal forces of yin and yang. Jewish beliefs, 
mirrored in the accounts in the Tanach (Old Testament), stressed moral 
failing and divine intervention as a primary cause of madness as in the case 
of Nebuchadnezzar (Daniel 4:31-33) but also as in Samuel 10:6 the voice of 
the often unrecognized prophet. All of these cultures placed the mad in a 
separate category: for some a higher one of prophecy and illumination, but 
for most one of marginality and exclusion. All developed some types of 
therapeutic interventions for the latter, not necessarily for the former.  
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 Roman and, later, medieval medicine and society made the 
distinction between the naturally born idiot and the lunatic, terms that 
overlap with and permeate medieval law and medicine. The former were 
not seen as treatable, but the latter were. The moral stigma and legal 
treatment of both, however, were clearly parallel. The question of causation 
mixed theological, physiological and mystical etiologies, to varying degrees 
at different times and places. The means of treatment were similarly mixed: 
from spiritual exorcism to the use of somatic interventions such as diet to 
restore mental balance and physical control and restrain the individual from 
actions that could harm their estates. This was also the case in Islamic 
medicine, which had transmitted much of Greco-Roman social and medical 
attitudes on madness in the Middle Ages to Europe but which also was 
permeated by Christian and Jewish medical practice in Europe and beyond. 
According to Sura 4:5 of the Qur'an:  
 
Give not unto the foolish what is in your keeping of their wealth, 
which Allah hath given you to maintain; but feed and clothe them 
from it, and speak kindly unto them. 
 
This is a cultural translation of the Roman medico-forensic notions of 
‘furiosus’ and ‘non compos mentis’ in limiting economic damage to an 
estate by a mad parent’s fiscal irresponsibility, a notion that is itself linked to 
the theological understanding of madness from the New Testament 
(Matthew 4:24).23  
 As the notion of the hospital evolved in the early Middle Ages, 
specialized institutions for the mad developed as early as 705 A.D. in 
Baghdad. This tradition had spread into Spain and Western Europe by the 
late Middle Ages. While a form of medical incarceration appeared for 
diseases such as leprosy and madness, the mad were rarely permanently 
housed in such facilities. Unlike lepers, who were understood to be 
contagious, they were usually incarcerated for a limited time, usually because 
of the costs to local communities for extended confinement, and then 
released. Leprosy and madness generated a sense of dread derived from the 
prevalent images of the leper and the insane. It was of little surprise that 
specific institutions grew up to socially isolate these sources of public 
anxiety. By the Renaissance, madness also became a conceit for the view 
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that one’s mad actions could be a sign a sign of sanity in a world gone mad. 
As William Shakespeare had Hamlet say in 1601: ‘I essentially am not in 
madness, But mad in craft’.24 This view of madness as a metaphor for sanity 
in an unstable world would become a commonplace of Romantic views of 
insanity and, indeed, part of the idea of madness thereafter.  
 By the nineteenth century in Western Europe the idea of a moral 
treatment of the insane, as well as the isolation of the idiots seen as 
inherently incurable from the treatable lunatics, was generally accepted. 
Moral treatment aimed at the return of the lunatics to their proper place in 
the world through the moral and secular correction of the 
misunderstandings of the world and their inappropriate actions. Thus 
weekly dances for the inmates were a standard practice in the reformed 
asylum to reestablish the moral order of their inmates. Led by lay directors, 
such clinical facilities gave way in the course of the nineteenth century to an 
ever-greater degree of medicalization across Europe and North America, so 
much so that their directors by the close of the century were virtually all 
medically-trained alienists. This development in treatment paralleled the 
professionalization of psychiatry and neurology and the creation of a 
systematic set of diagnostic categories as well as treatments. Most of these 
were based on physiological principles, though strongly psychological 
interventions paralleled them at the close of the century. Suddenly madness 
as a category gave way to other terms such as ‘affective disorder’ as John. 
Bucknill and Daniel Tuke state in their standard Manual of Psychological 
Medicine.25  
 Even so, the nineteenth century placed its emphasis on somatic 
definitions of madness. Wilhelm Griesinger in 1868 wrote: ‘The so-called 
mental illnesses are found in individuals suffering from brain- and nerve 
illness’. 26  By the 1890s this view seemed to be universal in Western 
psychiatry. The neurologists of the time, such as the young Sigmund Freud, 
assumed this as a fact but question the relationship between organic sources 
of madness and the wide range of psychological manifestations of mental 
illness. Freud began a movement, psychoanalysis, which accounts for the 
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widest range of mental states as potentially leading to psychic pain yet 
without any direct organic cause. Indeed, Freud’s great insight is that bodily 
symptoms, such as paralysis, can have purely psychological causes and 
should be treated by psychological interventions such as talk therapy rather 
than physical treatments such as electrotherapy.27  
 The somatization of madness increased across the twentieth century, 
but it came at a cost. More and more symptoms were related to specific 
neurological deficits such as dementia. Development disorders came to be 
sorted out from illnesses with complex neurological causes – reductively 
dividing environmental diseases from genetic ones, for example – and thus 
further separating out those diseases seen as purely illness of the spirit, the 
psyche, or the mind. Thus the idiot and the lunatic, often housed in the 
same state institution through the nineteenth century, were by the early 
twentieth century seen as manifesting quite different social and medical 
causes.28 Indeed biological interventions such as sterilization dealt with such 
individuals not to aid them but to improve society by eliminating their 
ability to reproduce. As the United States Supreme Court justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr. concluded in affirming the Commonwealth of 
Virginia's eugenic sterilization law: 
 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.29  
 
Biological definitions of madness generated a wide range of biological 
interventions to limit and control madness. 
 Yet the greater the detail knowledge of the causes and meanings of 
madness the more the boundaries that defined it begin to shift. Thus 
general paralysis of the insane, the most common diagnosis for psychiatric 
patients in the nineteenth century asylum, came to be recognized as the last 
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stages of syphilitic infection following the development of a specific test for 
the syphilis spirochetes in 1906; it thus became a potentially treatable 
neurological disease rather than a form of mental illness. After specific 
treatments for syphilis were developed, general paralysis of the insane 
simply vanished from the diagnostic repertoire of most physicians who 
dealt with madness and the treatment of its characteristic symptoms entered 
other medical specialties.  
 
 
Madness and Neurodiversity 
 
The desire in the twentieth century was to find more and more cases in 
which madness was the result of specific biological, neurological, or genetic 
factors. Eugenic interventions, such as sterilization, came to be repudiated 
(if slowly) after the horrors of the Holocaust and its eugenically inspired 
mass murder of ‘inferior races’ as well as the disabled. Compulsory 
sterilization laws for madness existed in the United States from 1897 to well 
into the late 1970s and still occurs in isolated cases, such as the California 
prison system, until today. In light of the Holocaust, post-WWII medicine 
sought specific bio-medical interventions (mainly psychotropic drugs) that 
could have an impact on the symptoms of madness, then defined in terms 
of psychosis, a lesser or greater loss of the psychic connection to reality, and 
neurosis, the impairment of rationality that leads to psychic pain.30  
 Developmental disorders seem to have been bracketed in the search 
for a cure for a drug to cure madness. Yet the discovery of DNA in 1952 
and the subsequent discovery of the specific mutations for Down’s 
Syndrome in 1959 were more or less simultaneous with the first uses of 
lithium to treat the symptoms of depression and Thorazine (chlorpromazine 
hydrochloride) in 1950 to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia. The idea 
that there could be a genetic intervention to prevent all such developmental 
disorders is also an artifact of this post-WWII science as much as the now 
seemingly universal use of psychotropic drugs, from that first anti-psychotic 
medication in the 1950s to mood enhancers (Prozac) to drugs to treat 
hyperactivity (Ritalin). The expansion of drug treatment was first heralded 
by patients and physicians alike as effective interventions but quickly 
became a target of patient and social discontent given massive side-effects 
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as well as the over-prescription of many such drugs to ever widening 
categories of individuals. Madness seemed to become quotidian and yet the 
stigma of madness remained. 
 With the expansion of psychotropic drug use, the patient self-
consciously became the client and with such shift of definition became 
more and more self-aware. Twentieth- and twenty-first-century patient 
populations are now, in effect, consumers of medical care, and as 
consumers they organize and make demands – demands that range from the 
call for de-institutionalization and the closing of large public facilities 
housing individuals believed to be unable to function in the world to the 
desire to be released from the negative stigma of madness.  
 The rise of a contested science of madness in the nineteenth century 
provides a basis for the medical treatment of mental states as illnesses in the 
systematic classification of forms of mental (and other) illness. Begun in 
1893 by Jacques Bertillon as a positivistic description of illness based on 
observable symptoms and analogous to his work in criminology, this soon 
became a global phenomenon. Revised in 1898 by the American Public 
Health Association as the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, 
Injuries and Causes of Death (ICD) it was only after 1948 that the World 
Health Organization’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems appeared. It became the gold standard for 
international psychiatric classification, especially after its 8th edition of 1968. 
In 1973, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association, which had first appeared in 1952, assumed a global role in 
unifying the terminology for psychiatric classification. What was remarkable 
about these widely accepted means of describing mental illness is that they 
codified the contemporary views and attitudes towards madness globally 
rather than locally. And by doing so they claimed a scientific uniformity that 
existed only within their own closed systems.  
 In the 1960s, alternative perspectives on madness began to emerge in 
the works of Erving Goffman, R. D. Laing, and Thomas Szasz, offering a 
re-examination of the social causes of madness. These had a powerful 
impact on the de-medicalization of madness among feminist and gay 
activists in the 1970s. Where Goffman saw the asylum as a repressive means 
of social control, Szasz saw madness as invented by the patient as well as 
society. Laing saw madness as the ‘healthy’ product of sick social or familial 
structures. All of these models contributed to the growing patient 
empowerment movement of the time and began to shape the idea of 




disability beyond the medical model of rehabilitation (taken from 
interventions related to deafness and blindness) that had dominated the 
field from the 18th century.31 The idea of a relativization of madness (now 
freed of any medical implication) first appeared in sociological work in 
France in the work of Georges Canguilhem in the 1940s and, later, with his 
student Michel Foucault in the 1960s. In Folie et Déraison. Histoire de la folie à 
l'âge Classique (1961), Foucault dismissed the antithesis of sanity and 
madness as the result of medical power.32 One concrete result was that 
entire categories of madness such as homosexuality (in 1973) and 
premenstrual syndrome (in 1987) came to be dismissed from psychiatric 
diagnosis. More generally, the very idea of madness came to be suspect as 
stigmatizing rather than diagnosing. 
 Medical discourses of rehabilitation and disability inspired the 
creation of the category of psychiatric disability following the 1980 World 
Health Organization’s International Classification of Impairments, 
Disabilities and Handicaps of disability as the result of illness. Thus a 
psychiatric disability can be the result of a psychiatric impairment, which 
can be the source of the stigma of madness that impinges on the ability of 
the individual to function in the community. Different from other 
disabilities, such as developmental disabilities, psychiatric disabilities are 
seen as episodic and intermittent. But here the acknowledgement of the 
causality of the stigma of madness does not touch the underlying medical 
assumptions about the meaning of madness. 
 One reaction to this medicalized model of disability within the 
disability rights movement (and its allied academic field of disability studies) 
is to begin to see all forms of mental ability and emotional stability as 
ranged on a spectrum. The concept of a spectrum of human 
psychological/mental diversity comes as an answer to the older model of 
psychiatric disability. Harvey Blume coined the term ‘neurodiversity’ in 1998 
as a defining quality of being human: 
  
Neurodiversity may be every bit as crucial for the human race as 
biodiversity is for life in general. Who can say what form of wiring 
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will prove best at any given moment? Cybernetics and computer 
culture, for example, may favor a somewhat autistic cast of mind.33  
 
This followed from work in disability studies that spoke of the 
‘extraordinary’ body, the ‘rejected’ body or the ‘recovering’ body or, more 
recently, the ‘problem’ body. 34  Disability thus dealt the ‘reception or 
construction of [the] difference’ presented by a ‘physical or mental 
impairment’.35 Here one suddenly has the idea of the extraordinary, rejected, 
recovering, or problem mind.  
 Such ideas of madness and disability develop parallel to the growth 
of popular interest in autism, which also comes to be the litmus test of the 
new test case for madness within disability studies. As Paul Hellker and 
Melanie Yergeau note, ‘Public awareness and public discourse about autism 
are approaching critical mass’.36 Medically, autism has been defined as a 
psychiatric category since the early twentieth century. It is now seen as a 
developmental disorder with genetic or environmental causes. Certainly the 
flawed claims about MMR vaccination as the cause of autism colored its 
reevaluation at the end of the twentieth century by stressing the potential 
elimination of autism through social action rather that through genetic or 
medical intervention.  
 Today autism is increasingly seen as an alternative, even a preferred 
mental state, rather than as a deficit. It is the answer to Erich Fromm’s view 
that madness in modern society is a sign of humanity’s fall from ‘biophilia’, 
that is, from a sense of relatedness, rootedness and orientation.37 Autism has 
come to be a sign that individual autonomy can challenge and often 
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overcome notions of social isolation.38 The fascination with idiot savants in 
the late-twentieth-century public sphere (such as the autistic Raymond in 
Barry Levinson’s film Rain Man (1988)) gives way to a new focus on the 
autistic individual as a representative of neurodiversity. Asperger’s 
Syndrome is the new norm, exemplified by the film Temple Grandin [2010], 
Mick Jackson’s biopic that describes the youth of Temple Grandin, the 
iconic autist who is a professor at Colorado State University and Max 
Mayer’s Adam (2009), the account of a young man suffering from 
Asperger’s Syndrome. This framing of autism draws on debates about the 
autonomy of the client/patient from the 1960s and the image of a broader 
spectrum of mental health held by disability studies scholars. It rejects any 
sense of the autist as being severely impaired and in need of special facilities, 
only differently enabled. Indeed, both activists and scholars of disability 
have promoted the growing sense that autists are actually better enabled in a 
world that does not recognize their abilities. This is the theme of the best-
selling 2003 novel by Mark Haddon, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night-Time. (See the various positions in the special issue of the Disability 
Studies Quarterly on neurodiversity devoted to autism.39) This view is very 
much in line with the reinterpretation of bipolar disorder as the source of 
creativity by bipolar writers such as Jamison. 
 The need for public facilities for severely impacted autistic people has 
diminished as quickly in the twenty-first century as it did for the mad in 
general during the 1960s. The source of this decline is the sense that autistic 
individuals must function as part of a newly redefined public sphere that, 
according to law and custom, is now open to them, no matter how severe 
their individual state. The model for this is the treatment of Asperger’s 
Syndrome rather than severe, debilitating autism. Thus the politics of 
disability and madness can be clearly seen in the debates about autism in the 
twenty-first century. The Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) defines 
disabling madness as ‘any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental 
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and 
specific learning disabilities’ that ‘substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of an individual’ or that cause one to be ‘regarded as having such 
an impairment’. Both aspects of this definition assume a psychiatric 
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diagnosis. The British Disability Discrimination Act (1995) follows the 
standard handbooks of psychiatric diagnosis as well as the idea that such 
forms of mental illness must be chronic or recurrent.  
 In 2011, the Neurodevelopmental Work Group, led by Susan Swedo, 
MD, senior investigator at the National Institute of Mental Health, was 
tasked with revising the category of autism in the standard American 
diagnostic handbook of psychiatry, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5). They first suggested that the 
definitions of autism spectrum disorder be reworked and simplified. In 
DSM-IV, patients could be diagnosed with four separate disorders: autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, or the 
catch-all diagnosis of pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise 
specified. It was proposed to unify and clarify these categories.  
 The reaction from the autism community in 2011, now well 
organized into political lobbying organizations with substantial funding 
raising capacity and celebrity spokespeople, was swift and damning, seeing 
this medical decision as impacting on the funding for autistic clients as well 
as the exclusion of certain forms of autism from coverage in the law. The 
claim was that Asperger’s syndrome and about 25 percent of those with 
other diagnoses of autism would not qualify under the new DSM-5 category. 
The psychiatrists who suggested the reforms to DSM-5 quickly backtracked 
and the revision of the diagnostic category of autism spectrum disorders 
was again revised. When DSM-5 was eventually published in 2013, it 
reflected the political interaction between disability advocacy groups and the 
psychiatric community.40  
 The autists who successfully pressured the drafting committee for 
DSM-5 acted in complex ways. They demanded more medicalization (or at 
least reversing a trend toward de-medicalization) but at the same time they 
were able to exhibit their political clout as an interest group. Since the drift 
of most disability activism is to de-medicalize disability, this is a counter-
thrust. Neurodiversity is their cry but they also want to preserve their 
medical coverage and legal protections. The medical model for madness is 
still potent even as the disability world begins to try and erode its power. 
The autists do erode the power of the medical community by putting 
pressure on them to reverse their decision, but the result is more rather than 
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less medicalization. For autists as well as others diagnosed with mental 
illness or neurological disorder today, adopting the medical model of 
madness can still confer tactical advantage for some disability groups. Emily 
Martin showed this in the case of bipolar disorder, but it may well now be a 
truism in terms of how contemporary society deals with madness. 
 
 
 
 
